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You're Fired! The Cause and Effect of Managerial Turnover on Team
Performance: A Study of Major League Baseball
Abstract
This study aims at answering two questions: Why does a manager get fired and what impact does
dismissing the field manager of a baseball team have on subsequent team performance? It is
hypothesized that a manager will be fired when a team is performing poorly. If this is the case, a new
manager should improve performance; however, the fans and chief executives do not recognize the other
potential factors that lead to meager performance. Is it realistic to believe that getting rid of a manager
will automatically lead to increased winning percentages in a team? The decision to focus on
management within sports was made based on the fact that sports foster an environment in which there
is a huge cultural, social and economic impact on today‘s society (Audas et al., 1999). In one-way or
another, a majority of the population can relate to the sporting world. In addition, team performance is
easily measured in baseball making the data needed for this study accessible.
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You‘re Fired! The Cause and Effect of
Managerial Turnover on Team
Performance:
A Study of Major League Baseball
BETH TALENTOWSKI

I. Introduction
The basic structure of life is that of a ladder and
many aspire for the top. Those stationed on the
bottom rungs are determined to continue climbing
and those at the top will work hard to stay there, but
it is not always that easy. All corporations and
organizations are based on a large hierarchical
structure that separates ownership, power, control,
and performance. This composition of power makes
top management one of the most scrutinized
positions in any organization from large firms to
small nonprofit organizations to sporting clubs.
The manager, in sports in particular, is an extremely
volatile position that is under constant evaluation by
club owners and other officials in the front office.
Managers are responsible for making the day-to-day
decisions and ensuring the team performs well and
gets results. They are subjected to the public eye as
all actions taken and decisions made are widely
known and analyzed, making them an easy target
when things turn sour and performance slumps.
This study aims at answering two questions: Why
does a manager get fired and what impact does
dismissing the field manager of a baseball team have
on subsequent team performance? It is
hypothesized that a manager will be fired when a
team is performing poorly. If this is the case, a new
manager should improve performance; however, the
fans and chief executives do not recognize the other
potential factors that lead to meager performance.
Is it realistic to believe that getting rid of a manager

will automatically lead to increased winning
percentages in a team? The decision to focus on
management within sports was made based on the
fact that sports foster an environment in which there
is a huge cultural, social and economic impact on
today‘s society (Audas et al., 1999). In one-way or
another, a majority of the population can relate to
the sporting world. In addition, team performance is
easily measured in baseball making the data needed
for this study accessible.
It is hypothesized that managers will be dismissed
when a team is suffering from poor results. In
regards to performance following the said change in
management there are a number of competing
theories and hypotheses. A reverse human capital
theory states that a change in management will
cause performance to suffer even more as there is no
discernable difference in managerial abilities across
current managers and the change simply disrupts
the team even more. The human capital theory, on
the other hand, hypothesizes that a change in
management produces better results and an increase
in performance due to the assumption that the new
manager coming in is better equipped than the
previous. Finally, the scapegoat theory hypothesizes
that a change in management has no significant
impact on team performance as the manager is fired
as a scapegoat and not the true source of problems
within the team.
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II. Literature Review
There seems to be a general consensus with past
research on the effect of performance on managerial
turnover: when performance is bad, the manager
goes. Managerial retention is highly contingent on
firm performance. This relationship is evidenced in
a study by Eitzen and Yetman (1972), in which finds
that unsuccessful basketball teams experienced more
coaching changes as coaches failed to produce a
winner were replaced. Other research by Lieberson
and O‘Connoer (1972), Helmich (1977), and
McEachern (1975) all discovered that chief
executives at large firms were more likely to change
when the firm was experiencing declining profits.
The following study expands this research to include
more data on sports organizations. Porter and
Scully (1982) identified a basic ―survival of the
fittest‖ idea in their study in which a manager is
responsible for transforming scarce resources into
outputs, and failure to do so results in dismissal.
They found that managerial skill contributes
significantly to the production process through an
analysis of managerial marginal revenue product
(Maximaino 2006). These findings agree with the
others above that suggest poor performance leads to
managerial discharge, an idea which is consistent
with the human capital theory.
There is not as much unanimous consensus when it
comes to the changes in performance, or lack
thereof, following a change in management. Grusky
(1963, 1964) looked at professional baseball teams
and found that managerial turnover was more likely
to occur in teams that were doing poorly and once a
new manager took over, performance suffered even
more. This hypothesis is tested and supported by
Carroll (1984) and Brown (1982), who studied
newspaper publishers and football coaches,
respectively. Both found that instead of improving
performance by hiring a new person, it disrupted the
flow and set things back even further.
On the contrary, Guest (1962) and Davis-Blake
(1986) suggest a positive relationship between new
management and performance. These hypotheses
stem from the notion that there is a novelty effect
that accompanies new management in which new
and unique ideas lead to improved performance and
the idea that the new management is simply more
competent and knowledgeable than its successor.
Many other studies found middle ground results
where there was no conclusive significant
relationship between managerial succession and
performance. In his population ecology theory,
Aldrich (1979) claims that organizational
performance is based solely on environmental

factors, thereby ruling out any impact of internal
management. Gamson and Scotch (1964) also
conclude there is no significance between
management firing and the resulting performance of
a team. In terms other than sports, Boeker (1992)
finds, in his study of the role of management in a
corporation, that when a firm is performing poorly
and has a powerful top executive, instead of stepping
down or being replaced the high executive will
dismiss top management instead as a scapegoat
(Boeker, 1999).
In summary, the literature suggests that a manager
will be fired when the team they manage fails to
perform well. In addition, the literature provides a
number of different views when focusing on the
effect of dismissal. Some studies suggest a new
manager has the ability to turn things around and
improve a franchise, while others find that a new
manager does nothing but complicate matters more.
Due to the lack of consensus in previous literature,
this paper is designed to determine which theory and
which idea presented in past studies is most valid in
professional baseball.
III. Theoretical Review
This paper is set up as a competing theories
framework, with a human capital based theory
competing with a scapegoating theory. A simple
human capital theory is employed to assess
productivity of a manager and the probability of
turnover. The manager or coach is responsible for
transforming the given inputs into wins (Fizel &
D‘Itri 1997). Essentially, each team is a production
function in which certain playing inputs, such as
skill, team cohesion and decision making, lead to an
output, such as number of wins or ranking. This
theory suggests that as long as a manager is utilizing
all his inputs efficiently and effectively, the team will
perform and he will retain his position. Dawson and
Dobson (2002) looked into this idea as well and
analyzed the variance among managers based on a
human capital framework. Differences are
evidenced in areas of shirking, ability and
experience. In relation to a human capital model,
the higher the ability and experience, the better the
performance.
Another theory that explains team performance and
branches from the human capital theory is the
common-sense one-way causality theory, which
focuses on the idea that the field manager of a
baseball team is the prime influencer on the
performance of his team. For this reason, when a
team is not doing well, the manager is consequently
fired. This theory supports the fact that the clubs
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that have done the worst over the years are the same
clubs that have changed their management most
frequently. Hopefully by replacing the old manager,
a new, more effective manager will take his place and
lead the team to a more successful season. As
Haveman (1993) found, succession improves
performance by reducing conflict and enabling the
organization to be more aware of the environmental
demands (Haveman, 1993).
In response to the theories above, is it always the
manager‘s fault when a team is not doing well?
What about the players and the front office? Maybe
teams with high turnover perform worse because the
manager is not the issue and attention should be
focused elsewhere. A number of conflicting theories
attempt to explain this relationship between team
performance and management, specifically
managerial turnover. These theoretical notions
include the idea that turnover leads to improved
performance partially due to a novelty effect and in
part based on the notion that the successor can avoid
the errors his predecessor made. The hypothesis
suggested by this human capital argument is that a
team‘s win-loss record will improve with dismissal.
Another possibility that is also consistent with
human capital theory is that the opposite will take
place and the relationship between turnover and
success is actually negative; the higher the turnover
rates, the lower probability for success. A new
manager will disrupt the team and lead to conflict
(Grusky 1963). Haveman (1993) broaches this
notion as well arguing that succession diminishes
performance because it disrupts routines, interrupts
command, and increases employee insecurity
(Haveman, 1993). This theory suggests that
management change disrupts productivity and
hypothesizes a decrease in winning percentage.
Finally, there is the scapegoat theory. Unlike the
preceding theories, the scapegoat theory suggests
there is not a significant relationship between
managerial effectiveness and performance, thus
negating any perceived impact of succession on team
quality (Gamson and Scotch 1964). In this case,
managerial action is more a symbolic act than
anything else (Haveman 1993). Forces external to a
manager‘s control substantially effect organizational
outcomes; therefore limiting a leader‘s impact on
organizational performance. Decisions made by the
field manager have little impact in the realm of the
talent he is given to work with. For example, with a
different manager, would the New York Yankees not
perform as well regardless of the extreme talent
throughout the team? Probably not. However, since
the field manager is the most publicized official in a
sports organization, when a team is not performing

up to par, it is easy to get rid of the person making
the day to day decisions, not only to focus the blame,
but to appease the fans who are looking for some
hope for change and improvement for their
hometown team.
One way to show that it is not the effectiveness of the
manager that determines success is the mere fact
that managers that have been fired by one
organization enjoy good perspective employment
opportunities as coaches in other clubs. Although
one manager may be slightly more effective than
another, the variance among talent in managers is so
small it is seemingly a constant (Gamson and Scotch
1964). Based on this information, often times it
seems as if a change in management reflects an
insignificant change in performance, not because of
the turnover, but because the decision to hire the
manager was made based on scapegoating and the
real issues are not addressed. All teams experience
a ―slump‖ in performance at some point in the
season and firing the field manager has become a
―convenient‖ way to make adjustments in team
dynamic even though real improvement needs to
stem from long-term organizational decisions. The
front office and players can blame the manager for
responsibilities that may in actuality fall on their
shoulders. Forces external to the leader‘s control
that substantially affect an organization‘s outcome,
thus limiting the manager‘s overall impact. The
scapegoating theory suggests that management
change has an insignificant effect on the team‘s winloss record.
IV. Empirical Model and Data
This study uses a two-stage analysis; first to
determine when or why managers are fired followed
by a natural experiment in which winning
percentages from teams that experienced midseason changes in management will be analyzed in
order to gauge any increases or decreases in
performance. The 13 teams in the American League
will be analyzed from 1998-2008. These years were
chosen as they contain the most recent data and past
studies have not focused on this era. Within these
years a total of 30 management changes took place,
17 of which were within season changes. A probit
regression will be used to analyze the following:
Manager Change= B1+B2WP+B3CWP+B4Salary.
WP is the winning percentage in the year in question
and CWP is the change in winning percentage from
the year in question and the preceding year. For the
change variable, the winning percentage from the
year t-1 is subtracted from the winning percentage in
year t. Therefore, a negative value signifies the
winning percentage was greater in year t-1, thus
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demonstrating a decline in performance over the two
years and vice versa. It is necessary to include both
winning percentage and the change in order to take
into account teams that have had a slump in
performance between the years and those teams that
have continuously performed poorly. Teams with
consistently poor results would have no significant
change in winning percentage, but are still
performing subpar, making them a strong candidate
for change. Salary has been included to account for
expectations. A team with a higher salary cap will

have more money to spend on the top players;
therefore increasing people‘s expectations for the
season. With higher expectations there is a higher
chance they will not be met, leading to disappointing
results and the dismissal of the manager. This is a
difficult variable to gauge as the reverse could
potentially be true as well when expectations are
removed from the equation. A higher salary, in
general, translates to better players and more wins,
decreasing the chance of dismissal. See Table 1 for
variable information.

Table 1: Table of Variables
Name
Definition
MC
Dummy Variable for management change. A value of 1
is yes, 0 is no.
WP
The teams winning percentage in year t.
CWP
The teams change in winning percentage from year t to
year t-1 [t-(t-1)]
Salary
The teams available salary in year t.
In the event a management change took place in
between years, the change was attributed to the
season before change. This is based on the
assumption that the performance of the team during
that season was subpar so a change was made before
the start of the next season. A problem with this
model is the time of turnover; within the season or
outside of the season. For out of season turnover,
factors such as trades and training can impact the
performance of the players and team, therefore
affecting the winning percentage but having little to
do with management. This discrepancy can skew the
results showing a favorable increase in performance
from one manager to the next.
he first model incorporates all 30 management
changes, but only the 18 observations that
experienced in season change will be used in the
second. To accurately determine the effect of the
change itself on performance, a simple comparison
of winning percentages before and after a
management change took place in teams that
experienced mid-season changes will be carried out.
Winning percentages from before and after the
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Observation
MC
154
WP
154
CWP
152
Salary
154

Min
.1818
.5038
-.0005
7.05e7

Expected Sign
Dependent Variable
Negative
Negative
Unknown

change will be compared and analyzed to detect any
significant improvement or decline in performance.
By focusing on teams that changed managers within
a single season, other outside factors will be
controlled for. No factors, such as salary cap or team
composition will have changed. The only factor that
can have an impact on the team is the manager, thus
any changes in performance can be attributed to the
change in management. This first model will help
lay the groundwork for determining the effect of a
change on the team.
he data for this study comes from Major League
Baseball‘s season statistics. Such websites include
The Baseball Almanac and Baseball Reference where
player, game, season, and coach statistics are kept
dating back to when teams first emerged on the
professional baseball scene. Information on manger
change and winning percentages comes from the
Baseball Almanac. The other variables are from The
Encyclopedia of Baseball. Table 2shows the
descriptive statistics.

Max
.3870
.0787
.0728
3.71e7

V. Results
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Mean
0
.265
-.257
1.58e7

Std. Dev.
1
.716
.192
2.09e8

The first model is a nonlinear estimation, a marginal
effects probit regression, to evaluate the probability
of the occurrence of the dependent variable, MC:

The coefficients can be interpreted as the estimated
effect of a one unit change in the independent
variable on the probability of a manager change.
The results are shown in Table 3.

Manager Change=B1+B2WP+ B3CWP+B4Salary.

Table 3: Dprobit Regression
dF/dX
Std. Err.
Z
MC
WP
-.79
.47
-1.66
CWP
-.94
.47
-1.96
Salary
4.32e-10
9.26e-10
.47
N=154
r-square= .08
*denotes significance at the .1 level **denotes significance at the .05 level
After running the regression, all coefficients
emerged with their expected sign. Both winning
percentage and change in winning percentage were
significant, while salary did not have a significant
impact on managerial dismissal. This could be the
case because the public may not be aware of a team‘s
exact salary expenditure and therefore do not use it
as a means of judging the performance of the team.
The coefficient of -0.79 suggests that with a one
percent increase in winning percentage, the
probability of managerial dismissal decreases by
0.79 percent. Similarly, a one percent increase in
change in winning percentage, meaning the team is
performing better in the current year relative to the
Table 4: Comparison of Means
Variable
Overall Mean
WP
.5038
CWP
-.0005
Data for change, the winning percentage for a team
that experiences a change in management, was
collected only from teams that experience
managerial turnover within a season. Data for no
change was only collected from teams that
experience no change in management, including a
change between years. By doing this it is possible to
look at change and no change as two separate
entities. It is clear that mean winning percentage
decreases in years there is an in season management
change for a team. This finding suggests that the
new manager did not improve the record for the
team in that year. Looking at the table, it is clear
there is a large difference in the means
corresponding to a change in winning percentage
between change in management and no change in
management. The negative mean for change
suggests that teams performed worse in the year of
the change compared to the year before. This value

P>z

95% CI

0.096*
0.05**
0.64

-1.70, .13
-1.87, -.01
-1.4e-9, 2.2e-9

years before, translates to a decrease in chance of
removal of 0.94 percent. These findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that it is when
performance suffers that managers have to worry
about being let go.
Now that evidence shows why managers are fired, it
is important to look at the effect of this action on
team performance. First, the average winning
percentage for teams that experienced mid-season
change was computed and analyzed against teams
that had no change. A comparison of means can be
seen in Table 4.

Change in Manager
No Change in Manager
.4334
.51
-.0431
.01
also implies a decline in performance in the year of a
management change.
More direct observation produces some unbalanced
results. When looking at straight winning
percentages for each manager in the season of
change, 13 of the 17 observations showed an increase
in winning percentage, while only four showed a
decrease in winning percentage from the manager
who started the season to the manager who finished
the season. This statistic proposes an increase in
performance on average of 0.05, or five percent. In a
season that typically has 162 games, five percent
translates to about 8 games, which in most cases is
significant. The winning percentages for most teams
tend to cluster around 0.500, or 50%. An extra eight
games won could move a team up significantly in the
standings, especially when the difference between
the first and second place teams is usually only a few
games. This finding is in accordance with the
human capital theory in which the new manager was
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better equipped than the previous and was able to
help the team. However, the data also contained a
few outliers, which skewed the mean upwards. In
one case, the initial manager was only in his position
for six games and did not win any of them. This
caused the increase in winning percentage to be
.355, much higher than normal. With this
observation excluded, the average increase was only
0.03, or roughly five games. Although five games is
Table 5: Comparison of Winning Percentages
WP Manager 1
WP Manager 2
.476
.418
.420
.430
.551
.395
.453
.467
.384
.462
.000
.355
.348
.385
.242
.294
.577
.512
.347
.400
.286
.392
.383
.655
.393
.463
.423
.400
.473
.580
.385
.389
.294
.384
The table above shows the winning percentage of
each team that experienced a management change
under both managers. A negative value for change
in WP shows a decline in performance with the new
manager. By looking at the table it is clear that
performance increased on more occasions with a
new manager. However, closer analysis shows that
teams that did better won an average of five more
games, while those who suffered lost an average of 11
more games under new management. This varied
data makes it difficult to ascertain if the impact of a
new manager is positive or negative. There is not
enough confidence in either direction, showing that
a change in management has no overall, consistent,
impact on team performance. A team may win more
or lose more games under new supervision, but it is
not significant enough to state that a manager has
certain, concrete effects on team performance.
Although not proven, these findings open up the
possibility of the scapegoat theory.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the results of the multiple regressions and
analyses described above, it is clear that on average a
manager is fired when his team is performing poorly.

still an improvement, it is not enough to drive a last
place team into first. In addition, those teams whose
performance suffered under new manager, on
average, saw a decrease of 0.075 in their winning
percentage. This value translates to 11 games which
could set a team back significantly. See Table 5 for a
numerical representation.

Change in WP
-.058
.010
-.156
.014
.078
.355
.037
.052
-.065
.053
.106
.272
.070
-.023
.107
.004
.090
It is not as clear; however, what the impact of this
change is on performance. The average comparison
of mean winning percentages across teams that
experienced a within season change compared to
those who completed a whole season with one
manager implies that a new manager is ineffective in
boosting winning percentage in the year they took
over. On the other hand, when comparing the
winning percentage of a new manager to its
predecessor, it seems as if the manager is able to
increase performance, even if only a few games.
Although this data shows more teams saw improved
performance, those who suffered did so by a much
larger margin than those who saw increases in
winning percentage. In order to fully interpret this
finding, it is imperative to determine what number
of extra wins is significant.
Overall, the change in winning percentage, whether
positive of negative, is seemingly inconsequential
showing that a change in management has no
significant impact on team performance. Without
knowing the inner workings of a baseball
organization it is impossible to know the exact
reason someone was let go and therefore assume an
act of scapegoating; however, this study shows that
there is indeed a possibility this theory is correct
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given the lack of substantial improvement in a team
once a new manager replaces the ―problematic‖ one.
To expand on this idea in the future and improve
upon this research, future research should consider,
the winning percentage in the seasons following
dismissal seasons Although this brings in some
confounding factors, it would be interesting to see
how the new manager does over time and how
performance changes. It is entirely possible that a
team performs well initially with the new manager
due to a novelty effect, but after some time the same
unsolved problems emerge and performance once
again begins to slump.
It would also be beneficial to look at other factors
that influence team performance. Initially a third
model was under consideration to assess which
variable has the greatest impact on winning
percentage. The additional variables under
consideration are variables that are out of the
manager‘s control yet are vital aspects of a sporting
organization, such as salary cap, draft picks, slugging
percentage, etc. The human capital theory suggests
that proper use of inputs is enough for success, but
what if the inputs are sub par? If the scapegoating
hypothesis is correct, the other factors would be
found to be stronger than management, proving that
in times of distress and poor play managers are let
go due to scapegoating. The problem with this
model, given the time constraints, is the inability to
determine a measure for management. The MC
variable used previously could not be used in this
case because it was not the change in management
under consideration, but the effect of the manager in
general.
Another important variable that could add
considerably to this study is a measurement of
managerial effectiveness. It has been said that there
is a very small variance between managerial abilities,
but the ability to account for these difference could
impact the results substantially.
Many implications arise from this research for
teams, managers, and franchises. It is clear that a
manager is fired when a team is performing poorly,
but a new manager is not necessarily capable of
fixing this. It is unreasonable to continuously
replace manager after manager until a suitable one is
found. The baseball industry as a whole needs to
start exploring other options. Different trainers and
training techniques can be brought in and sport
psychologists can help improve team morale when
play is suffering. Multiple fires and hires are
financially straining on any organization. Finding
out root causes for failure can prove to me cost
effective in the long run. The ideas presented in this

paper can also be generalized to businesses and
corporations. By implementing new practices and
exploring the causes of problems, businesses can
save money and better reach their goals.
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